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Why Spencer Gore decided it was time for Bedrock Materials to close up shop.
It wasn’t too long ago that the battery world was abuzz over sodium-ion batteries and their potential to be a cost-effective domestic competitor to the Chinese-dominated lithium-ion industry. The prevalence of sodium and the early-stage sodium-ion supply chain seemed to give the U.S. a shot at developing the next big battery for electric vehicles and energy storage systems.
But this past weekend, a promising sodium-ion startup called Bedrock Materials announced that it was shutting down and returning most of its $9 million seed funding to investors. The reason, according to CEO Spencer Gore? Its business model no longer made sense.
“We were responding to a very unique moment in the history of the battery industry,” Gore explained to me about his decision to start the company, which made cathode materials for sodium-ion batteries, in 2023. “Lithium prices had gone up about 10-fold, and so had other battery minerals by lesser degrees.” Experts predicted that the world was in for a long-term lithium shortage. Then the opposite happened: Lithium producers rapidly ramped up supply at the same time EV demand growth slowed, leading to oversupply and a 90% drop in price.
Before all of that happened, Bedrock saw the EV market as a good bet. Automakers were telling Gore that their first priority was lowering costs, and sodium-ion batteries seemed well positioned to help with that. The EV industry was also orders of magnitude larger than the battery storage market, and stood to benefit from the $7,500 consumer tax credit in the Inflation Reduction Act, which incentivizes the use of domestic minerals and battery components.
The election of Donald Trump threw the future of that tax credit into sudden doubt. The cratering raw minerals market, on the other hand, didn’t immediately translate into falling prices for lithium-iron-phosphate cathodes, the chemistry Gore saw as Bedrock’s main competitor, he told me. So long as this lasted, he thought, Bedrock’s business would be viable. But it didn’t.
“LFP prices have now crashed down to the point where it would almost be a viable business to extract the lithium from them and sell it on the open market,” Gore told me. “The active material producers are running single-digit margins. And so when that happened, it just became clear that the economic case for sodium had collapsed.”
Not everyone agrees that the domestic sodium-ion industry is doomed. Bay Area-based Peak Energy, for example, is still chugging away, and the company’s president and chief commercial officer, Cam Dales, told me he doesn’t expect to face the same headwinds as Bedrock. For one, Peak is targeting the sodium-ion energy storage market rather than the EV market, which means that energy density — sodium-ion’s weak point — is not as important a factor. Secondly, Peak is not in the business of producing battery materials, which Dales sees as an inherently risky and low-margin proposition. Rather, the company plans to produce battery cells domestically by 2028, while sourcing cathode and anode materials from other, ideally domestic, manufacturers.
So while the economic benefits of sodium-ion batteries have certainly diminished, Dales told me that the potential performance benefits — longer cycle life, greater efficiency, and ability to withstand high temperatures — are exceeding his initial expectations. Specifically, Peak is developing a cathode chemistry composed of sodium iron phosphate powder, which Dales claims will save customers money over the 20-year lifetime of a storage project, even if the upfront cost of sodium-ion battery cells is now higher than LFP. “System-level and project-level economics vastly outweigh smaller differences at the cell level,” Dales claimed.
The two industry leaders know each other well, as they used to work together at the lithium-ion battery manufacturer Enovix, where Dales was the chief commercial officer and Gore led the EV products team. Dales said he was bummed to learn of Bedrock’s closure, but not surprised. For domestic battery materials producers such as Bedrock to thrive, Dales told me, he thinks temporary policies that protect and nurture their growth will be necessary to ensure they’re not instantly outcompeted by Chinese incumbents.
“Absent that, it’s hard to see how you build a new materials company in the U.S. and compete against a fully scaled supply chain in China,” he told me.
Indeed, when I asked Gore if there was anything he wished he had done differently, he responded without hesitation, “I would have gone to China the very first day that I founded the company.” When he did visit months later, he said his main takeaway was that “most of the sodium-ion companies in China were producing material at scale, but losing money doing it,” even though they were “essentially producing sodium-ion materials on the exact same production lines that they had been using for lithium-ion materials.” The interchangeability of the two production processes made it crystal clear to Gore that Chinese battery giants such as CATL and BYD already had a tremendous advantage over the U.S., which doesn’t have scaled-up battery facilities.
This is why Gore now rejects the notion that the U.S. could win the race to scale up sodium-ion. “If you lost it for lithium-ion, you’ve already lost it for sodium. It’s the same thing, same equipment, same process.” Now he’s more interested in figuring out a way to facilitate a “once-in-a-generation” transfer of knowledge and technology between the U.S. and China. As it stands, he told me, “they’re 20 years ahead of the rest of the world, and we can’t even tie our own shoes.”
Ironically, bolstering domestic industry was the primary rationale behind Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, which have since been put on pause for every nation except China, which will now be subject to 145% levies. And while Dales thinks tariffs would be a net-positive for his company, Gore told me he doesn’t expect them to help the domestic sodium-ion industry overall.
For one, tariffs will make the price of constructing domestic battery materials and cell facilities even more expensive than it already is relative to China. “So that’s one thing nudging us towards spreading out the factory costs over more energy dense cells,” Gore told me. Another incentive to optimize for energy density, tariffs or not, is the 45x tax credit, which gives cell manufacturers $35 per kilowatt-hour for domestically produced cells. “On a global basis, there’s a strong incentive for the most energy dense cells to be produced in the U.S.,” he argued.
While Peak will also have to contend with higher construction costs due to Trump’s tariffs as it builds out its sodium-ion cell production facility, the company’s customers are independent power producers and utilities that can pass cost increases onto ratepayers. This will mean higher electricity costs for Americans, which Dale acknowledged is not ideal, but he also told me, “I don’t think it actually affects our business that much.” While the company wouldn’t publicly disclose its partnerships, Dales said it’s “working with the majority of the large IPPs in the country,” as well as “a number of” utilities.
Gore thinks it’s possible that the sodium-ion performance advantages Peak is betting on will prove to be compelling for customers and investors in the energy storage space. It’s just not a bet he was willing to take. While Bedrock did explore pivoting into the energy storage market, Gore said he concluded that LFP batteries could likely be engineered to achieve the same cycle life, efficiency, and operating temperature benefits that Dales thinks makes sodium-ion stand out.
“Ultimately, we failed to find a niche where we thought that sodium was the best product,” Gore told me. Some investors were initially reluctant to accept that. They encouraged Bedrock to keep going, to pivot, to place a different bet. They had certainly never had a founder try and give back money before, Gore said. But to him, it just made good sense.
“It’s still possible that we would have succeeded,” he told me. “But I think that the likely size of the success and the likelihood of a success, given everything that we’ve now learned, is considerably smaller. The best expected value for us and for our investors was to simply return their money.”
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Energy Innovation has some bad news for House Republicans.
House Republicans are racing to overcome intraparty disagreements and deliver their “one big, beautiful” budget bill to the Senate before the Memorial Day weekend. As currently written, the bill would render the nation’s clean energy tax credits largely inaccessible, severely impairing clean energy development.
We now have a more detailed picture of what’s at stake if this bill or something like it makes it all the way to the president’s desk. The research firm Energy Innovation modeled all of the energy and environment provisions in the version of the bill that passed the House Budget Committee on Sunday night. It found that the proposed changes to oil and gas leasing, greenhouse gas emissions standards, and tax credits, could cost the United States more than $1 trillion in GDP over the next decade compared to a world where these policies remain untouched.
That number is a reflection of the narrow subset of policies the group modeled and does not take into account Trump’s tax cuts. In theory, those could have a positive effect on GDP that offsets some of the loss. But the effects on energy costs and jobs on their own tell a grim story.
By 2030, the average American would spend $120 more per year on transportation and home energy costs than they otherwise would. By 2035, the increase would climb to more than $230. Lower demand for clean technologies like electric vehicles and solar panels would kill more than 700,000 potential jobs across the economy in 2035.
Energy Innovation isn’t the only group warning of dire consequences. The bill “represents a crisis for America’s ability to build the energy infrastructure we need to meet surging demand,” Abigail Ross Hopper, the CEO and president of the Solar Energy Industries Association said in a statement yesterday. The group estimates that the bill would put 287 factories that serve the solar industry at risk of closing or never opening in the first place. Most of those are in red states.
The forecasts stem from key changes the GOP is proposing to make to tax credits that incentivize wind and solar development, domestic manufacturing, and consumer adoption of electric vehicles and energy efficiency upgrades. The bill would end these subsidies earlier than currently planned (though how much earlier is currently in flux), and impose stricter materials sourcing requirements, tighter development timelines, and more rigid project finance rules for the years they remain in effect, making it nearly impossible to use them.
As a result, fewer wind, solar, and energy storage projects would get built. Those that did get built would cost more, meaning that natural gas would set the price in energy markets more frequently. Natural gas would also be more expensive because of higher demand. The Energy Information Administration already expects natural gas costs to rise this year and next, even without changes to tax incentives. Altogether, generating electricity would cost about 50% more in 2035 than it otherwise would, according to Energy Innovation, which would translate to roughly 17% higher bills for consumers.
Budget hawks in the House are now pushing for an even more aggressive phase-out of the green tax credits before they agree to send their legislation to the Senate, and the Republican leadership can afford to lose just three votes on the floor, giving them a narrow window to please everyone. But the earlier phase-out would have little impact on Energy Innovation’s findings, Robbie Orvis, the senior director for modeling and analysis for the group, told me. The existing provisions in the bill that prevent companies from sourcing materials from China would be so difficult to meet that the model assumes the affected credits would be unclaimable beginning next year.
The modeling shows a similar effect in transportation costs. Terminating the tax credit for electric vehicles would lower demand for EVs and increase demand for gasoline, causing prices at the pump to go up. Less demand for EVs would also mean fewer domestic jobs producing them, and fewer jobs producing the components that go into them. Then there’s the overall tightening of purse strings that would come as a result of higher energy costs, which could reduce hiring still further.
Orvis said the estimates for job loss are likely conservative, as the model looks at changes in demand for EVs and other clean technologies but doesn’t do a good job accounting for the changes in supply that would result from early repeal of 45X, the clean manufacturing tax credit.
Notably, energy costs go up in the model despite provisions in the bill that are designed to lower the cost of oil and gas. Those include more frequent lease sales and lower royalty rates for companies that pay to drill on federal lands and waters. But Energy Innovation found that demand-driven price increases more than offset any price declines resulting from these measures.
The tax credit termination also isn’t the only factor here. Energy Innovation included the House’s proposed repeal of the Environmental Protection Agency’s emissions standards for cars and trucks, which amplified the effects. This provision may not make it into the final text, however, as the special rules governing the budget reconciliation process in the Senate prohibit policies that aren’t budgetary in nature. As the nonprofit Environmental Defense Fund put it in a memo to reporters, the regulations were issued to protect public health, and while they do result in costs and benefits for Americans and companies, they do not change the federal budget. “Even if Republican leadership tries to claim any budgetary impacts here, they would be clearly incidental to the main purpose of the proposed legislation,” the group said.
Of course, at least seven Senate Republicans have been vocal about their disapproval of the House’s treatment of the tax credits, so the whole thing may still be subject to change.
“This is what you’d expect from China,” a veteran mining industry lobbyist told Heatmap.
President Donald Trump is chasing a new American mining boom. In the process, he’s making quick bets on projects that haven’t completed routine financial analyses or would be situated in environmentally sensitive areas with significant legal risk — and occasionally both at the same time.
In March, Trump issued an executive order that changed the landscape of American mining for the foreseeable future, commanding agencies to approve permits for individual mines as quickly as possible and requesting government funds go toward domestic mining. The Interior Department has also taken strides to hasten the environmental review process for mining on federal lands, asserting that it will complete comprehensive analyses in less than 30 days, a truncated time-table the likes of which mining industry lobbyists have long sought.
So far in his second term as president, Trump’s administration has claimed to have approved, expedited, or publicly endorsed at least 28 different mines and mineral exploration projects, according to a review of Bureau of Land Management notices and federal permitting databases, with more likely in the offing. Many of these projects may very well produce minerals required for key energy or defense purposes, and some of them are guaranteed to do so. But at least a few have not yet been proven to be economically viable in the way investors typically expect from mining companies.
Conservationists have decried these actions as an unnecessary risk to sensitive landscapes, which could be irrevocably changed without a guarantee of improved energy security. And even some in the mining industry are quietly noting these examples, saying they could represent a paradigm shift in how America treats the mining industry.
“This is what you’d expect from China,” a former veteran mining industry lobbyist told me, requesting anonymity to protect their current business from retribution. “The U.S. prides itself on mines that are good neighbors. The U.S. doesn’t have a perfect record, but those are things that it values.”
“I’m not saying the companies are going to do something wrong here,” the source continued, “but we don’t know that.”
The most headline-grabbing example of this rush to permit came last week, when the Interior Department said it would for the permitting of a large uranium mine in Utah known as Velvet-Wood. The department said it would complete Velvet-Wood’s environmental review within two weeks — a process that has historically taken years.
On first blush, abbreviating the approval process for a mine that will produce energy fuel for nuclear power plants resembles the sort of permitting reform that climate hawks and centrist policy wonks have craved for years. Velvet-Wood’s developer, Anfield Energy, claims the site will also produce vanadium, a strategic mineral used in defense-grade steel.
A deeper examination, however, exposes signs of haste that go beyond all deliberate speed.
Ordinarily, mines take years to develop for reasons wholly unrelated to the federal permitting process. Usually a project requires years of exploration and study to verify that the area where digging will happen holds proven “resources” and then “reserves.” Think of resources vs. reserves as the difference between lukewarm and high levels of confidence that minerals are not only present but also economic to mine and process. It is unusual for any mine to be built without proven resources, let alone reserves, and feasibility studies are the way companies usually communicate that level of proof to investors. These studies have also been a primary mode of conveying a project’s value and design to the government.
Until our present policy moment, the permitting process was so lengthy that it made little sense to pursue it without first giving investors the certainty brought by a feasibility study. Anfield and other companies appear to have found a work-around to demonstrate that certainty, however, at least to the government: Asking to dig in places where mines used to be decades ago.
Anfield has not yet completed a feasibility study for Velvet-Wood, which would include the site of a former underground uranium mine. The most recent study of the project was a 2023 “preliminary economic assessment” that documented some of the old mining infrastructure and otherwise largely referenced historical data about mineralization. The company stated in the report that the study was “too speculative geologically to have economic considerations applied to them,” and that “there is no certainty that the preliminary economic assessment will be realized.”
In Anfield’s own press release announcing the Trump administration’s decision to quickly permit the project, the company states that it “has not done sufficient work to classify these historic estimates” for uranium and vanadium at the site. Anfield did not respond to requests for comment on why the company requested government permits before finishing a feasibility study.
Under the Velvet-Wood deposit’s previous owner, Russian mining company Uranium One, a draft feasibility study did find economically viable uranium. But that study is more than a decade old and was not made public, according to press materials at the time.
In order to become operational, Anfield expected to have to update the decades-old plan of operations for Velvet-Wood, according to the 2023 economic assessment, which also said BLM would need to take into account the impacts of restarting a formerly operational mine, as well as mining in areas that have not previously been mined before. That’s quite a lot of work to complete in only two weeks. While it’s possible that staff at Interior got a head start on their review when Anfield submitted its mine plan last year, they have not confirmed anything to that effect since the department’s announcement about permitting the project.
Aaron Mintzes, senior policy counsel for the mining reform advocacy group Earthworks, told me the practice of approving a mine before feasibility studies have been done carries the risk of painting a misleading portrait to investors about a project’s viability.
“Every mining company does this. All of them. If you’re a publicly traded mining company and you want investors to give your mine money, you must provide a feasibility study. That’s how you know they’re telling the truth,” Mintzes said of this approach. “Investors should be upset about this.”
In an email, BLM press secretary Brian Hires told me that “feasibility studies are not legally required by BLM for mining projects.”
“The BLM continues to ensure appropriate environmental oversight including coordination with other agencies, balancing mineral development rights and responsible public lands management,” Hires stated.
On Velvet-Wood, Hires said the agency acted under “recently established emergency procedures” created under the Trump administration to quickly approve new resource projects. “The expedited review is expected to significantly contribute to meeting urgent energy demands and addressing key threats to national energy security.”
Velvet-Wood is not the first mine Trump’s Interior Department has expedited so early in the approval process.
On April 8, the Trump administration gave Dateline Resources, an Australian company, a green light to build a large mine inside of the Mojave National Preserve. Like Velvet-Wood, the project, known as Colosseum, got this approval without a feasibility study. Colosseum would be a gold mine, according to Dateline’s website, which also states that the project is “prospective” for producing rare earth elements as a byproduct. The company cites previous radiomagnetic reviews by the U.S. Geological Survey and the project’s proximity of roughly 8 kilometers — or about 6 miles — from an operating rare earths mine, Mountain Pass. The company also cites decades-old information about the site from when it used to be an operating gold mine in the 1970s and 1980s.
Are there rare earths at the Colosseum dig site? There may be — but how much and how commercially useful they’d be are normally determined through a feasibility study process.
BLM approved Colosseum without any new environmental review, or at least nothing that was public at the time it made the decision known. Instead, it said in a five-sentence press statement that Dateline could rely entirely on a construction and operations plan from the previous mine, which shut down in the 1990s.
BLM’s press release also referred to Colosseum as a rare earths mine, with no mention of gold.
“For too long, the United States has depended on foreign adversaries like China for rare earth elements for technologies that are vital to our national security,” the release stated. “By recognizing the mine’s continued right to extract and explore rare earth elements, Interior continues to support industries that boost the nation’s economy and protect national security.”
Hires, the BLM press secretary, told me that the agency made this claim to highlight “the project’s potential to produce rare earth elements, which are required for economic and national security.”
On April 21, investors were informed that a “bankable feasibility study” was now “underway.” But that didn’t stop Trump from jumping far ahead of the usual process a few days later, publicly calling the project “America’s second rare earths mine” on Truth Social.
There’s a big reason this area stopped being mined, by the way: According to the National Park Conservation Association, the area is heavily restricted from mineral development under a law Congress passed in the early 1990s, the California Desert Protection Act.
There is a separate law that provides companies the ability to mine in national preserves and parks under very specific and limited conditions, and with the approval of the National Park Service, the association told me. Kelly Shapiro, an attorney representing Dateline, told E&E News in a story published last week that Interior told the company its mine plan of operations was “valid.” Shapiro also told the news outlet that “rare earths have been found at the Colosseum mine site.”
Dateline has now begun work at the mine site and conservation activists are sounding public alarms. The company did not respond to requests for comment.
Asked why BLM gave Colosseum the right to construct a new operating mine, Hires said the project site, which has not been active for decades, “is not a new mine.” He said the facility was granted the “right” to “continue mining operations” under the plan from when the site was active in the 1980s, which the agency said “includes exploration for rare earth minerals.”
Before I came to Heatmap, I spent years writing about the mining industry. One of the stories I’m proudest of was an investigation into the amount of mining needed to build the vastly different energy and transportation systems we’ll need to fully decarbonize. So I can safely say this: We truly will need more minerals like lithium, copper, nickel, graphite and cobalt to decarbonize, and we might need to open more mines to get them, although recycling and technological innovation could easily reduce the tonnage required over time.
The Trump team has a different argument for mining this much. It says our country needs to wean off foreign sources of metals because relying on imports is a weakness in the eyes of hawkish security experts.
For the past decade, U.S. policymakers of both parties have rallied behind the basic notion that the country should stop relying as much on minerals from nations considered to be adversaries by the national defense apparatus, including China and Russia, as well as companies perceived to be substantially controlled by those nations. The idea first gained traction under Trump 1.0, leading to the creation of a list of so-called “critical minerals” that the military and domestically essential businesses rely on but are generally mined or refined in other countries.
Under Joe Biden, the “critical mineral” concept was magnified by multiple signature laws, including the 2021 infrastructure law and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which together established large grant and tax credit programs intended to stimulate a new American mining economy.
Trump has sped up the federal permitting process for some copper, nickel, and lithium mining and exploration projects. These commodities markets are ones in which China genuinely has an outsized influence, per national security experts, through market share and existing business relationships held by Chinese state-owned mining and refining companies.
Some of these U.S. mining projects likely would’ve been permitted no matter the outcome of last year’s election, either because their environmental impacts would be relatively limited or because they’d produce metals crucial for the energy transition that a Democrat-led government would have supported as a trade-off. Take South32’s Hermosa copper mine in Arizona, which the Biden administration fast-tracked and Trump 2.0 has signaled it will approve. A handful of these mines would supply a meaningful amount of defense minerals for which we currently rely on China, such as the Stibnite gold mine in Idaho, which would yield antimony for military-grade ammo as a byproduct.
Then there are special cases like the Resolution copper mine in Arizona, where the government’s hands are essentially tied under federal legal requirements to approve the conveyance of land to a mining company.
Other “transition metal” mining projects fast-tracked or endorsed by Trump 2.0, however, likely would not have been given priority — or even a second look — under a more neutral federal regulator. That’s because they are located in areas that officials under previous administrations fretted would produce outsized pollution risk and potentially run afoul of environmental laws.
Take for example the NewRange copper mine in Minnesota, which the company says would be the state’s only active copper mine if approved and constructed. NewRange is better known in the mining industry as PolyMet, which was its moniker for most of the nearly two decades it has been in the works. NewRange/PolyMet has struggled to get requisite permits, to the point of being referred to by its opponents as a “zombie” project, because it’s situated in an especially porous area of northern Minnesota covered in protected wetlands.
In 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency under Biden said the Army Corps of Engineers should rescind a water permit issued under Trump 1.0 because the project would violate the pollution standards of the Fond du Lac Tribe, which relies on the wet ecosystem to cultivate wild rice for subsistence and cultural practices.
At the beginning of May, the Trump administration added NewRange/PolyMet to a federal “transparency” dashboard that it says will soon have a timetable for approving the project under the same authority it fast-tracked Resolution. Representative Pete Stauber of Minnesota, whose congressional district includes the mining project, reacted in a statement that said the designation shows Trump “understands the vital importance of this project,” and that he looks forward to “seeing NewRange meet and exceed every permitting standard in a timely manner.”
This is an example of mine that, if approved hastily, would probably create new litigation just as fast.
At the risk of repeating myself, it’s not the only example of such a case, and there are more examples where the Trump administration has opened the door to new, legally risky directions on a mine.
Most notable in that pile is the Pebble mine in Alaska, which Trump halted during his first term but may be given what appears to be a last shot at survival under his new government. Decades of battle between a would-be gold mine and the denizens of Bristol Bay have dominated conversations around American mining. Opponents across the political spectrum have tried to stop the project because they fear construction would pollute the bay and its world-class fishing grounds.
The first Trump administration actually opposed Pebble after a private lobbying campaign by Donald Trump, Jr. and other conservative conservation advocates. Under Biden, the EPA issued a rare veto of the project area under a provision of the Clean Water Act. This was a step beyond simply rejecting the permit as it would, in the view of advocates, be a permanent restriction against development.
In February, the Trump 2.0 Justice Department requested a stay on the federal lawsuit filed against the veto by Pebble’s developer, Northern Dynasty Minerals, alongside top political leaders in the state of Alaska, who have argued that the agency overstepped its authority. On Wednesday, Justice Department attorneys filed a status report asking that the stay be extended for at least another month because while officials had been briefed on the subject, they “require additional time to determine how they wish to proceed.”
This indicates the government is still not ready to state its position, and leaves open a door for the Justice Department to flip sides. Northern Dynasty Minerals hopes a flip will happen. “This is an important position in any negotiation between a project proponent and a regulator, and for a process that could, hopefully, remove the veto and re-start the permitting process,” the company’s CEO Ron Thiessen said in a public statement made after the stay extension request.
It may be that even Pebble Mine is a bridge too far for Trump 2.0. But after all these other projects have gotten the skids greased, we must all wait with bated breath for the next shoe — er, pebble — to drop.
On a surprise agreement, DOE loans, and pipeline permitting
Current conditions: More than 7 million Americans are under risk of tornadoes Tuesday, including in the Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee valleys • There is “dreary” weather ahead for the Northeast as rain and cold return • It will feel like 107 degrees Fahrenheit today in Xingtai, China, where the average this time of year is 86 degrees.
The Trump administration has lifted its stop-work order on Empire Wind, an offshore wind project by Equinor that had already started construction south of New York’s Long Island when the Department of the Interior ordered it paused on April 16. New York’s governor, Democrat Kathy Hochul, apparently secured the agreement for construction to resume after three “roughly one-hour calls with President Donald Trump, the most recent on Sunday,” in which she emphasized the energy and job-creating benefits of the project, The Washington Post reports. In a statement, Marguerite Wells, executive director of the Alliance for Clean Energy, cheered the move, saying, “Today, I am reminded how proud I am to be a New Yorker. We thank Governor Hochul for being an early and continuous champion for offshore wind and for bringing her advocacy to the highest levels of government.”
As my colleagues Emily Pontecorvo and Jael Holzman previously reported, the stop-work order on Empire Wind had seriously jeopardized New York State’s chance of meeting its climate and clean energy goals, with offshore wind viewed as the route away from New York City’s reliance on fossil fuels. In AM yesterday, I also covered a report that the offshore wind industry was preparing to respond “with strength” to the roadblocks and opposition from the Trump administration. It reportedly cost Equinor $50 million per week to hold the project while the Trump administration deliberated its merits.
The Department of Energy plans to cancel seven major loans and loan guarantees, including a New Jersey transmission project and a low-income rooftop solar program, Semafor reports, per a “former DOE official close to the process.” The programs had all been conditionally approved under Biden, and also included a low-carbon ammonia factory by Monolith Nebraska, as well as a battery factory, a plastics recycling facility, and two others that had already been canceled by their developers. In sum, the canceled financing amounts to nearly $8.5 billion — which admittedly isn’t much of the roughly $41 billion in Biden-era LPO agreements that were yet unfinalized when Trump took office. At the same time, “it’s revealing that the administration would let these projects — most of which are in sectors where the U.S. is already far behind China — fall by the wayside, rather than take steps to prop them up,” Semafor’s Tim McDonnell notes.
A House Rules Committee document points to potential changes to the reconciliation bill as negotiations continue — including, perhaps, to permitting. The original bill stipulated that CO2, hydrogen, and petroleum pipelines could pay a $10 million fee to bypass the standard permitting process, a move that critics decried as a “pay-to-play privilege for gas pipelines.” Activists and Democrats had slammed the provision, with Evergreen Action arguing it “makes a farce of our permitting process and essentially legalizes corruption,” and that “Americans will be severely impacted by gas pipelines built through their communities.” But in the new version of the bill, the language describing the expedited pipeline permitting “is gone,” Notus writes.
There is still a long way to go in negotiations, as hardliners and moderates remain at odds. The Rules Committee’s vote on a final version of the reconciliation bill is scheduled for 1 a.m. Wednesday morning, in order to stay on track for a possible floor vote this week — although others are skeptical of the feasibility of that timeline.
Clean power manufacturing is expected to grow from supporting 122,000 American jobs today to more than 575,000 by 2030 if all announced manufacturing facilities become operational, a new report by the American Clean Power Association found. The report similarly expects the economic output generated by those facilities to grow from contributing $18 billion to the U.S. GDP today to $86 billion by the end of the decade. “Today’s report shows that the manufacturing activities across the clean energy sector drive a ripple effect of economic growth that extends far beyond factory walls, reaching every corner of the country,” Jason Grumet, the CEO of ACP, said in a statement.
While clean energy manufacturing has taken a hit under the Trump administration, with more than $8 billion in projects canceled, closed, or downsized in the first quarter of 2025 due to concerns about access to Inflation Reduction Act tax credits and loan financing, as well as greater economic turbulence, ACP found that many investments are concentrated in rural areas and Republican states. With 200 manufacturing facilities in the pipeline, the report calls for preserving energy tax credits, “facilitating a true all-of-the-above energy strategy,” and creating “a stable and strategic trade environment,” among other policies.
An anti-nuclear protest near Lingen, Germany, in 2023.David Hecker/Getty Images
Germany’s longtime opposition to treating nuclear power on par with renewables in EU energy policy appears to have ended. France, which gets about 70% of its power from atomic energy, had long pushed for broader adoption in Europe — and been stymied by Germany’s former chancellor, Olaf Scholz, who was skeptical of labeling atomic energy “green.” But the nation will pivot to join France under Germany’s new conservative chancellor, Friedrich Merz, leaving Austria as the last remaining holdout in the EU, Reuters reports. “When France and Germany agree, it is much easier for Europe to move forward,” Lars-Hendrik Röller, who served as chief economic adviser to former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, told the Financial Times. The pivot is not just about meeting energy needs, however; as one German official also told FT, “We are now actually finally open to talk to France about nuclear deterrence for Europe. Better late than never.”
“I only drained about 25 miles of range from the battery after powering my fridge and other devices for days.” —Scooter Doll, writing for Electrek about how he used his Rivian R1S as a backup energy source for three days after last week’s tornadoes knocked out his power.